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This paper wishes to problematize the foundations of production governance and offer an 
analytical perspective on the interrelation between agents’ preferences, strategic choice and 
the public sphere (defined by impacts of choices on “publics” who do not have an input in 
strategic choice, and by contextual conditions). The value is in the idea of preferences being 
social in nature and in the application both to the internal stakeholders of the organisation and 
its impacts on people outside. Using the concept of “strategic failure” we suggest that social 
preferences reflected in deliberative social praxis can reduce false beliefs and increase 
individual wellbeing. From this approach, the paper offers a taxonomy of production 
organizations, based on social preferences about two variables: (i) the governance form (i.e. 
ownership and control rights) (ii) other strategic decisions that characterize the management 
of a company at a more operational level, once its fundamental legal form has been chosen. 
Each dimension (governance and strategic decisions processes) is then categorised alongside 
two basic preferences: towards inclusion or exclusion of "publics" that have no substantial 
access to decision power about these variables. Our framework explains governance 
heterogeneity by contrasting exclusive and inclusive social preferences in cooperatives, social 
enterprises, as well as traditional corporations. A discussion of the evolution of social 
preferences and organizational forms is addressed through examples and regional 
experiences.  
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“We may desire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater equality 
of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the 
golden rule of cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will 
accomplish the results. There must be change in objective 
arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment 
not merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose 
that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle. 
Both things can happen and without a miracle. But only by first 
changing the jungle and desert.”  
     (Dewey, 1922, p. 27) 
1. Introduction 
 
We can observe instances in which radical innovations in governance and decision-making 
processes have been introduced by innovators as highly reasoned and structured replies to the 
experienced failures of production organisations to meet wider societal needs. “Creative 
responses”, using Schumpeter’s wording (Schumpeter, 1947), were searched by the founder 
of worker cooperatives such as father Jose Maria Arizmendiarreta, creator of Mondragon in 
the Bask countries. This is perhaps the most followed and celebrated example, but certainly 
not the only one. Employee buyouts were pioneered, in the 1920s UK, by John Spedan Lewis 
in the retail sector and more recently, in the 1980s, David Erdal led the transition to employee 
ownership of the family paper mill Tullis Russell (Erdal, 2011). The complex constitutional 
settings that innovators elaborated expressed preferences about aims and processes that were 
in stark opposition with the corporate governance and work policies of the 1920s and 80s. 
The role played by individual choice, nonetheless, does not rule out the relevance of the 
context. In this sense, the entrepreneur’s choice can be considered as a highly reasoned reply 
to historical contextual conditions, facilitated or obstacled by the institutional network and 
social relations in which they are embedded, whilst at the same time remaining central to the 
introduction of governance innovations and their diffusion (Granovetter, 1992; North, 2005). 
In line with socio-economic approaches, we therefore view the entrepreneur’s  choice of 
governance and subsequent strategies as the expression of the preferences of a socially 
embedded individual (Granovetter, 1992).  
Leading from these considerations, the paper wishes to problematize the foundations of 
production governance and offer an analytical perspective that unbundles the interrelationship 
between agents’ preferences, strategic choice and the public sphere (here defined by impacts 
of choices on “publics” who do not have an input in strategic choice, and by contextual 
conditions). Specifically, by redeveloping a foundational perspective on the meaning of the 
public sphere, the paper aims at clarifying the potential of different preferences to meet 
societal needs. From this approach, the paper offers a taxonomy of production organizations, 
based on social preferences about two variables: (i) the governance form (i.e. ownership and 
control rights) (ii) other strategic decisions that characterize the management of a company at 




a more operational level, once its fundamental legal form has been chosen. Each dimension 
(governance and strategic decisions) is then categorised alongside two basic orientations: 
towards inclusion or exclusion of "publics" that have no substantial access to decision power 
about these variables.  
Analytically, the private and the public (or socially embedded) dimensions of individual 
action have been traditionally kept separate. In On Liberty, Mill seeks the philosophical basis 
for protecting individuality from the authority of society. The latter, for Mill, identifies the 
meaning of “public,” which should not interfere “…when a person's conduct affects the 
interests of no persons besides himself…” (Mill, 1859/1869, Ch. IV). The interconnections 
between private actions and public impacts have been however explored in the analysis of 
market failuresi. More recently, behavioural theory has explicitly accounted for the 
interaction of preference formation with contextual conditions such as economic, social, 
political and cultural institutions (Bowles, 1998). Within organisations, individual preferences 
have been argued to respond to incentive systems and to the experiences activated by 
interactions with co-workers and managers (Ben-Ner and Ellman, 2012).  
Consistently, the public dimension, in the interpretation of this paper, is not the arena of 
governmental policies,ii as in Stigler (1971) and Posner (1974), or central planning, as in 
Hayek (1944). Rather, we consider the public dimension as 1) the objective environment 
represented by the social, economic, cultural institutions which affect the formation of 
particular tendencies in the way individuals act (prior to action); 2) the known and unknown 
variable wave of influences that radiates from each individual choice (following action). 
What we aim at stressing more explicitly, in comparison with established theories, is that 
preferences and related choices are not, by their very nature, purely private, not least in their 
antecedents and consequences. Rather, following Dewey (1922, 1927), we openly recognise 
that, not some, but each private choice must include a public dimension:iii 
“Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting an affair of 
food as truly as of tissues of stomach … There are specific good reasons for the 
usual attribution of acts to the person they immediately proceed. But to convert 
this special reference into a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading as to 
suppose that breathing and digesting are complete within the human body.” 
(Dewey, 1922, p. 24). 
A Deweyan approach, in this sense, underpins also the economic contributions mentioned 
above, for which particular patterns in the choice of processes and aims are not to be 
attributed solely to the individual dispositions of the decision-maker (e.g. the entrepreneur, 
the worker, the consumer), but also to a contextual component defined by the habits, norms 
and established practices which underpin choice and the attainment of outcomes. Our 
working hypothesis, in line with behavioural theories, is that contextual conditions concur in 
the definition of individual dispositions. The other side of the coin would be that individual 
dispositions can affect existing institutions, socio-economic aims, processes and outcomes. 
We explain that enquiry-based processes are a pre-condition to make sense of the complexity 
of such interconnections, looking for solutions that reduce the failure of production 




organisation to meet each and every need across society. In this work, enquiry - as a way of 
thinking - explains also the nature of social preferences (since assessment and consequent 
changes in preferences are based on such praxis) and organizational forms.   
A further clarification is also needed on the idea of consequences, or outcomes. Because the 
nature of the decision process is the outcome of “an act of choice” (Sen, 2002: 159), we 
regard the choice of process jointly with the generation of outcomes since, as Sen points out, 
particular processes are preferred in view of their anticipated ability to achieve certain 
outcomes or avoid undesired ones. “Comprehensive outcomes”, in Sen, include both the 
choice of process and their expected “culminating” outcomes (ibid.). We say “expected” since 
whilst the actor may have a particular aim in mind, the actual result may be different. Here 
contextual elements matter in determining the final outcome (Dewey, 1922).  
With an emphasis on the interconnectedness of individual choices and contextual 
components, we consider all preferences underpinning production choices as “social,” or 
having a public dimension, whether inclusive or exclusive of the effects on others and society. 
We then argue that in the current economic environment, strategic choices do not reflect, as a 
norm, dispositions towards the inclusion of the public dimension of choice, therefore 
preventing production choices to achieve collectively beneficial ends (Cowling and Sugden, 
1998a). Following these considerations we present a framework to discriminate among 
business types and provide possible explanations for the emergence and persistence of 
exclusive rather than inclusive preferences in the choice of organisational forms and 
processes. In particular, we reason on what elements can be expected to lead to changes in the 
nature of social preferences amongst economic actors, reinforcing, in our conclusions, the 
role of individual dispositions as well as the meaningfulness of institutions and policy action 
in supporting and empowering the expression of inclusive social preferences. Non-systematic 
evidence based on specific examples is used to illustrate our arguments. 
 
2. The Public Dimension of Preferences and Outcomes 
To explain the ambiguities that can originate when overlooking the interconnections between 
individual action, socio-economic institutions, and public consequences consider the 
conceptualisation put forward in Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998):  
“Self-regarding preferences concern the individual’s own consumption and other 
outcomes, other-regarding preferences concern the consumption and outcomes of 
others, and process-regarding preferences concern the manner in which the 
individual in question and others behave, including the ways in which they attain 
outcomes of interest. We shall refer to process-regarding preferences mainly as 
values, but sometimes also as codes of behaviour, mores, ethics, and by other 
terms, depending mostly on the context”  (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998, p. 7) 
A pragmatist perspective may help to comprehend how this conceptualisation may overlap at 
a number of cross-roads. As private actions have public bearings, it follows that also self-




regarding preferences underpinning private actions have a public impact: they regard the 
sphere of others. Applied to a standard ultimatum game for example, this means that the 
‘private’ choice of the proposer engenders a public sphere, whatever the degree of fairness of 
the proposer’s decision, as the proposer’s choice impacts on the recipient’s welfare and sets 
her reaction, which, in turn, affects the proposer’s welfare. A pragmatist perspective suggests 
that the public dimension would be present even if the decision did not account for others’ 
welfare, or that there is a broader public and societal dimension of consequences which 
transcends the individual perspective.iv 
The idea of procedural preferences, in parallel, reflects how the agent wants to achieve a 
certain intended aim. They can therefore be understood in terms of the agent’s assessment of 
the rights and duties to be entailed by the process attached to an outcome of interest (Sen, 
2002). It follows that a process-based perspective always entails a view on aims and 
outcomes, since each process will be designed in view of opening up a certain set of 
opportunities, and avoid unwanted consequences (ibid.). Thus, the largest the distance 
between desired and existing processes, the lowest individual wellbeing will be. As an 
illustration, suppose there are three potential alternative processes X, Y, Z and that the 
preferred outcome O can only be reached by processes X and Z. The agent prefers X to Z 
whenever X is available. Process Y instead can achieve outcome C. If in the agent’s state of 
affairs only process Y is available, outcome O is not an opportunity. The actual outcome will 
not meet the agent’s preference, meaning that her needs or desires will not be fulfilled. 
 
Moreover, like Dewey in philosophy, Sen (2002) and Hirschman (1982) in economics, a 
number of scholars in organisational psychology and industrial democracy have reinforced the 
view that processes, like other outcomes, represent something from which individuals can 
receive fulfilment (Guthrie, 2001; Spreitzer, 1995). Within organisations, deliberative 
processes and employee participation in decision-making, in particular, have been shown to 
be a prerequisite for the development of high quality communication, information sharing and 
trust inside organizations (Ostrom, 1990; Deci & Ryan, 1990), thus contributing to reinforce 
workers perception of meaning, competence, self-determination and impact (Messersmith et 
al. 2011; Spreitzer 1995). It follows that individual wellbeing is not the exclusive result of 
attaining a preferred outcome, but derives also from elements of the psychological contract 
between the individual and its organisation, or from the enjoyment attached to the experience. 
For example, suppose agent A’s actions at work are strictly directed and monitored by her line 
manager. Despite the high wage, in absolute and relative terms, she is dissatisfied. Contrary to 
the work practices currently in use at A’s workplace, she greatly values autonomous thinking 
and critical engagement with colleagues before decisions of interest are taken. A’s current 
work context and practices are therefore in contrast with her self-fulfilment.  
 
From this example we can also appreciate the relation between process-outcomes and 
culminating outcomes. Besides being dissatisfied, A’s critical thinking is frustrated by 
excessive direction and control. As a consequence, new ideas are scarce and problem solving 
is not effective (Cf. Ostroff (1992) for an account of the relation between involvement, 




satisfaction and performance). The processes chosen by the firm are, as a result, highly 
incompatible with innovation, thus lowering the quality of services (and the wellbeing) 
offered to users. Workers and users’ interests, in this example, are disregarded by the firm’s 
organisational processes. This leads us to a further point, for which preferences on processes 
do have, like preferences on culminating outcomes, a social or public dimension, which 
implies that procedural preferences too regard others.  
3. Enquiry and deliberation 
 
Besides the impacts of choices on society at large, Dewey talks about the existence of a 
plurality of “publics” rather than “the public” as a monolithic entity (Long, 1990; Branston et 
al. 2006). In this sense specific publics are generated by each action, and each agent is part of 
one or more publics (Dewey, 1927). An appreciation of outcomes, for Dewey, comes from the 
discovery of such complex interactions. One important element of knowing about the larger 
set of needs, views and implications of so-called private choice is that it strengthens 
assessment (Dewey, 1917; Buchanan and Vanberg, 1991). In economic terms, this means that 
new knowledge can affect what individuals believe and value, as well as their preferences 
(Witt, 2003). The problem of beliefs, specifically, may be also understood by considering the 
limitations of inductive and deductive reasoning, for which inductive knowledge is subject to 
the limits of biased (or positional) observations (Popper, 1959; Sen, 1993), whilst deductive 
knowledge may suffer from the use of incorrect assumptions (Lakatos, 1975).v The pragmatist 
approach builds on the desirability of enquiry, rather than (albeit surely not inconsistently) on 
the centrality of altruism and reciprocity (as in Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 
2001). Specifically, since the public dimension is only partially known prior to experience, 
enquiry-based thinking would represent a foundational element of all aspects of human 
experience, hence underpinning the constant assessment of needs, preferences, processes and 
outcomes. Decision-making processes, from this angle, would very much resemble the 
scientific construction of knowledge, which is by its very nature inter-subjective and 
evolutionary.  
 
Facing the problem of knowledge coordination Hayek (1945), for example, argues in favour 
of the price mechanisms, whilst Dewey (1927), as mentioned, suggests the desirability of 
deliberative practices based on enquiry.  The two mechanisms differ in the type of 
assumptions and outcomes. The market mechanism aggregates knowledge through price 
information, building on the existence of different but complementary interests of buyers and 
suppliers. Differently, deliberation contemplates a variety of perspectives and interests that 
may or may not be compatible or complementary. It requires, therefore, more complex rules 
of interaction, formal and informal. This approach differs from market coordination also in 
the way it accounts for social consequences stemming from so-called private action. The idea 
of positive and negative externalities deriving from private market choices recognises that 
prices account only for some of the effects of decisions, whilst spilling over on other agents 
who do not directly participate (Coase, 1960). In this case the economic agent either ignores 
or does not care for impacts on others (unless different property rights or incentives are 
designed), and yet such consequences are part of the scenario. In the theory of externalities 




what are called selfish preferences can be described as situations in which the agent knows 
about the externality but decides to exclude such positive or negative effects from his/her 
decisions. Albeit selfish preferences can also generate positive externalities, when effects are 
negative this “exclusive preference” causes most social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990). In the 
same way, partial knowledge and bounded rationality can prevent actors from recognising the 
externality problem. From a pragmatist perspective, however, something more fundamental 
than knowing about the externality is involved. In order to account for the public dimension 
(defined in terms of complex interactions with the context), processes and practices need to be 
designed and developed with the aim of enhancing learning, i.e. uncovering impacts, avoid 
undesired ones by cooperatively searching for possible solutions. This involves the definition 
of coordination mechanisms that are more complex than the market, such as processes centred 
on deliberation and shared decision-making amongst publics. It follows that decision makers’ 
preferences are expressed, in the first place, deontologically, i.e. in the definition of processes 
and praxis (rights and duties) from which wider social impacts derive.  Moreover, deliberative 
processes originate social outcomes that are at least partially intended and governed, whilst 
the price mechanism generates externalities, which are not considered part of the objective 
function of the decision-maker (at last formally). 
 
From a pragmatist perspective, the nature of preferences underpinning the choice of economic 
processes and relations can be assessed by looking at the extent to which these foster enquiry, 
cooperation and trust. Enquiry, as envisaged by Dewey, is in fact understood as a way of 
thinking that can eradicate partial understanding or false believes from our courses of action 
by considering each and every existing and future perspective critically. It underpins the 
experience of non-isolated individuals who are able and enabled to use their “creative 
intelligence” to assess and change social institutions, as well as their own preferences and 
related outcomes (including processes). The argumentation goes as far as to indicate 
deliberation as the preferred coordination mechanism (Dewey, 1927). Deliberative decision-
making processes are defined as pluralistic, in the sense that the aims of participants may 
diverge, whilst still retaining a common will to find a deliberative shared solution to 
problems. To this end, deliberation supports open communication based on the quality of 
argument, on the explanation of meanings and experience (regardless of the medium used to 
express it, Young, 2000) rather than on power or information asymmetries (Habermas, 1984). 
In other words, the fact of having a particular aim in mind is not a sufficient reason for 
suggesting it to others, unless the agent finds a good reason or argument to support it, and for 
others to agree. Deliberation brings new knowledge in the decision process and this 
contributes to cast individual preferences. The shared process however is not seen as in 
contrast with autonomy. Likewise, the pluralism of deliberation improves agents’ motivation 
to implement decisions, as well as agents’ fulfillment in achieving results that are aligned with 
intended outcomes (Cohen 1989 p. 34). The efficacy of deliberative practices, in this sense, 
needs scrutiny, with the aim of assessing whether deliberative capacities exist, if diverse 
communication modalities are integrated and potentially conflicting interests accommodated, 
thus minimizing failure to meet public needs and creating the conditions for individual 
fulfillment. 




4. Inclusive and exclusive social preferences 
 
It follows that the first problem for the decision-maker becomes of assessing the desirability 
of the process per se, its relation to the desired outcomes. Since enquiry asks for multiple 
perspectives to be equally considered, not only knowledge but also decision-making power 
needs sharing. Therefore, enquiry, as a way of thinking, favours the choice of inclusive 
processes, as for example those entailing shared deliberation. We call inclusive social 
preferences those that underpin the choice of inclusive process-outcomes.  
 
If enquiry, as a way of thinking, can justify social preferences for inclusive processes, on the 
contrary the lack of enquiry conditions and attitudes (e.g. incentives that favour the 
exploitation of information and power asymmetries) further develops exclusive attitudes 
reinforcing the choice of exclusive process-outcomes. We call exclusive social preferences 
those that underpin the choice of exclusive process-outcomes. Social preferences for 
exclusive processes encompass the public dimension to the extent that they marginalise the 
interests of the publics affected (others) or the interests of society at large (the common 
good), therefore encumbering the needs and wellbeing of the excluded (culminating 
outcome).  
 
Albeit inclusive preferences tend to adhere with inclusive process-outcomes and vice versa 
exclusive preferences with exclusive process-outcomes, processes and preferences are not 
equivalent. Inclusive preferences can be expressed, for example, in exclusive contexts. 
Likewise inclusive processes may host exclusive behaviours and fail to deliver culminating 
outcomes as envisaged (Ben-Ner and Ellman, 2013). This may happen if actors express 
exclusive social preferences within an inclusive framework. Managers or workers may shrink 
due for example to inconsistent motivations, information asymmetries or lack of appropriate 
monitoring mechanisms (Cf. Ben-Ner and Ellman, 2013 and Grimalda and Sacconi, 2005 for 
experimental results). We have suggested that, because powered by enquiry, inclusive 
processes can reduce the distance between the culminating outcomes of the decision-making 
process and what publics deem as desirable, thus furthering fulfilment. Still there is no 
guarantee that this outcome will be achieved since it depends on a combination of contextual 
conditions and individual attitudes. 
 
One outcome of engaging with the process is the refinement of social preferences. A 
movement towards inclusive preferences, for example, can be prompted by the failure of the 
conventional for-profit enterprise to respond to societal needs, as the experience of several 
co-operators and social enterprises shows (Borzaga et al. 2011). Alternatively, a failure of 
self-managed firms to deliver member benefits, paired by poor enquiry and recognition of the 
issues can reinforce a movement towards exclusive preferences amongst the members who 
may opt to exit the cooperative or transform it into a conventional firm. A more detailed 
discussion about the evolution of preferences is in the last part of the paper. 
 




5. A taxonomy of production organisations 
 
Reflecting on the nature of free trade, Cowling and Sugden (1998a: 349) have referred to the 
impacts of exclusion from strategic decision-making processes as strategic failure or “the 
failure of an economy’s system or process of strategic decision-making to yield the most 
appropriate outcomes for the society served by that economy” due to strategic decisions in 
production being concentrated in corporate hierarchies and made by a restricted group of 
managers or stockholders. Differently from the type of intelligence that serves some interests 
even at the detriment of others, we have argued that true enquiry requires a cooperative 
discovery process, it entails knowledge creation but also shared access to knowledge and 
decision-making. Choices based on inclusive preferences reach beyond the individual actor’s 
sphere not only because they impact on others and society at large, but also by means of 
processes based on engagement, shared decision-making and learning (the “positive 
freedom” aspect) (Berlin 1958; Joas, 1996; Offe, 2011; Sacconi, 2011).  
Because of the observation of strategic failure across economies due to exclusive preferences 
and related choices in production organisation, we are raising a question on how production 
can move towards a more inclusive reality, so as to reduce failure to meet societal needs 
(Sacchetti and Sugden, 2011). We have argued for the inherent public and social dimension of 
each and every preference expressed through individual decisions and have focused in 
particular on the need to establish conditions that encourage a habit of enquiry, pluralism and 
cooperation, as those are, tendentially, not pivotal in conventional production governance 
settings. We have considered preferences on aims, process outcomes as temporary (because 
subject to enquiry) and comprehensive (because interrelated). The next step is to use these 
ideas to identify a framework which can support the assessment of the social preferences and 
choices expressed in production.  
We consider two procedural aspects: the choice of governance form (as ownership, rights and 
duties) and the choice of decision-making processes (as the praxis of collective decision-
making). The choice of governance and decision-making processes are the outcome of the 
decision-maker’s social preferences, within a particular institutional context. Culminating 
outcomes (firm’s impacts) can be then associated with process-outcomes. Therefore, we 
suggest considering the choice of governance and of internal decision-making practices as a 
mediator between the decision-maker preferences and public outcomes. We use in particular 
social preferences regarding governance choices and other strategic decision-making 
practicesvi as an indication of the decision-makers pre-commitment towards enquiry.  
Processes that reflect inclusive social preferences would be designed so that situations can be 
problematized, and not just regarding a restricted group’s private concerns. The aim would be 
to define rights, duties and practices that allow the search and inclusion of the publics and 
their multiple perspectives, as well as considerations of the wider common good. Close to this 
ideal are, for example, organisations created with the core aim of providing welfare, cultural 
or environmental services through multi-stakeholder governance (Tortia, 2010). Conversely, 
exclusive social preferences would not, as a norm, support the inclusion of other perspectives 




and interests in the process, rather than those of the decision-makers themselves. On this 
extreme we find for example traditional equity-based corporations with no or limited strategy 
towards stakeholder involvement. 
If we bring together social preferences regarding formal governance structures with those 
about other decision-making practices, we obtain the following hypothetical combinations. 
 
Figure 1: Social preferences in organisational choices 
             
 
 
The combination of social preferences regarding governance and those regarding strategy-
making highlights situations of homogeneous processes, as in cells one and four. Cells two 
and three present combinations of heterogeneous processes. In cell one, the initial inclusive 
social preferences supporting the choice of governance, exemplified, for example, by 
membership in self-managed firms, are consistently carried forward to include the strategies 
towards other publics, operating within (e.g. volunteers, salaried workers) and outside the 
organisation (e.g. suppliers or other actors in the civil society, such as users, costumers, the 
public administration, or other interested actors depending on the mission). Here are 
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cooperatives that specifically produce an economic and a social surplus without following the 
profit-maximisation rule (Valentinov, 2008). As Borzaga et al. (2011) emphasise, in 
cooperatives cost minimisation is not the one priority and, as long as the organisation is 
sustainable, the surplus takes also a social and psychological connotation. This is often the 
case for particular forms of social enterprises characterised by both mutualistic nature and 
multi-stakeholder governance. The crucial difference with socially responsible conventional 
business (cell three) is that conventional business fundamentally retains an exclusive 
governance structure centred on investor interests, even in the presence of corporate social 
responsibility. Differently alternative business forms such as self-managed firms with social 
aims have embedded, in principle, ideas of shared decision-making power and multi-
stakeholder benefit in their aims and governance structure.  
In cell four, we find quite the opposite, with a consistent persistence of exclusive social 
preferences, both in the initial choice of governance and in the strategic decision-making 
approach. 
In cell two we find organisations, such as cooperative firms, which set up processes to 
include at least one major stakeholder, which sets its objectives in an exclusive way. This is 
typically not the investor but the weakest stakeholder, i.e. the stakeholder that would incur the 
greatest loss if it were not the owner of the organisation. Inclusive preferences, however, do 
not extend beyond membership. Albeit founded on democratic governance principles, these 
cooperatives are mainly accountable to their members and do not implement particular 
practices for the inclusion of other types of interests. An exclusive focus on membership 
would be consistent with the neo-institutionalist analysis of cooperatives, which grounds the 
emergence of cooperative governance in the need for particular publics (such as workers, 
consumers, users, producers) to minimize transaction costs when market failure is present 
(Hansmann, 2000).  
In cell three we may find conventional investor-owned firms engaging in genuine strategies 
for the search and inclusion of publics. We can position here also social enterprises and non-
profit organisations in general (such as private foundations) with a board of managers that is 
strongly driven by the initial social mission, but with no membership.      
 
6. Evolution 
Our taxonomy depicts four representative situations. It is a static picture of ideal-typical  
features of organisations at any given time. But how do firms move from one cell to the 
other? Or, what elements can be expected to lead to the development of more or less inclusive 
patterns of behaviour amongst decision makers? The contradiction that we are left to explain 
is why, despite the fact that inclusive social dispositions improve understanding and validity 
of choices, the reality of production organisation is widely characterised by exclusion. There 
must be, then, a cumulative cycle which perpetuates one type of approach. The problem does 
not lay perhaps in the absence of subjective dispositions towards enquiry and inclusion, but in 




the institutional bias which does not favour the expression of such preferences and enquiry-
based processes more generally.  
Evolutionary theory has profusely made the point that institutional and organisational 
diversity and trajectories can be explained as path-dependence from specific historical 
accidents and choices (David, 1985, Arthur, 1994, North, 1990).  The relevance of contextual 
influences has been pointed out also by behavioural theory, which stresses that, at the macro 
level, the formation of socially inclusive habits is not immediate but associated with complex 
courses of value transmission through socialisation (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998). 
Evolutionary economists, in parallel, have offered a number of perspectives on the 
persistence of established patterns. Witt (2003), in particular, has argued that limited 
knowledge and, consequently, bounded rationality applies to preference formation in a world 
where incomplete perspectives impact on what agents value and aim at. This argument which, 
for us, has a clear Deweyan flavour, reinforces the frictions surrounding change on the one 
hand and the relevance of deliberation on the other. Deliberative practices can support 
learning and a change in beliefs, following which individuals will move attention to new sets 
of values and related means-ends (whilst still leaving other desires and behavioural frames 
“ignored or neglected,” (Witt 2003, p. 80)).  
For example, strengthened by their resilience to the cyclicality of economies and to 
complexity, the self-managed organisations initiated by innovators inspired, to some extent, 
wider social recognition and diffusion by means of imitation. Still, these represent minority 
solutions to the production governance problem. Witt (2003) suggests that widespread 
changes across economies would require communication across the community to attract 
agents’ attention. In particular, he argues that a crucial condition is that a “critical mass” of 
communicating agents and groups is reached, so that the new set of values can spread across 
the community. Communication and agreement on a novel set of values (as embedded in a 
new norm for example) will cast mutual expectations on behaviour and stimulate agents’ 
conformity with the new set of values (Grimalda and Sacconi, 2005; Sacconi and Faillo, 
2010). Also, some degree of proximity in the perception of values, ends and means amongst 
networks of decision-makers is relevant to start the deliberative process (Sacchetti and 
Sugden, 2009). The latter can be facilitated by policy action and agenda setting (Witt, 2003). 
These conditions are important to break path-dependence and institutional inertia and help 
overcoming situations that can reinforce false believes, limiting or slowing down the 
opportunities for change, even when more socially or economically efficient alternatives are 
available or when individuals show different social preferences vis à vis those embedded in 
existing governance structures (Cf. Mahoney, 2000). Other accounts reinforce that preference 
change can be affected by the ability of specific publics to articulate their perspectives on 
reality (Dewey, 1927), from the costs of participation, community size and actors’ distance 
(Dixit, 2009), or from disappointment and fear accumulated from prior interactions 
(Hirschman, 1982; Meier and Durrer, 1992 cited in Slembeck, 1997).  
Consistently with macro-approaches to change, within organisations motivational theory 
explains that individuals can gradually internalise contextual interests, values and rules. 




These internalised rules of behaviour concur to the formation of agents’ sense of who they 
are, so that their behaviour is sensed as autonomous and self-determined (Gagné and Deci 
2005, p. 335). Thus, driven by social institutions and established ways of organising 
production, social preferences towards process-outcomes become central to the agent’s 
identity. He or she would be likely to act in ways that are more or less consistent with enquiry 
and with including or excluding others more generally. Depending on these contextual 
conditions, the individual actor could, to different extents, come to appreciate the importance 
of multiple interests and of investing in deliberative decision-making processes.vii 
More specifically, economic theory has explained preference change in the organisation as 
reactions to the nature of rewards and punishments, for example in the form of financial 
incentives (Cf. Bowles and Polania 2009 for a review). Incentives and processes in particular 
signal what the incentive provider values in terms of behaviours and outcomes (Bowles and 
Polania, 2011). For example, Frey (1997) argues that monitoring counteracts individual 
autonomy and self-determination, with the result of lowering individuals’ trust and virtuosity 
(Ben-Ner and Ellman, 2012). Ben-Ner and Ellman (2012), however, argue that preference 
change happens gradually, rather than as instantaneous feedback to processes, “mediated 
through aversive interactions with work colleagues and bosses” (ibid., p. 405). In particular, 
the authors explain durable preference change with the emotions triggered by perceived 
inequity in the workplace. Placed in a context where selfish behaviour is rewarded, the 
altruist who experiences frustration can then decide to leave or to conform and stay. In the 
latter case, individual values and critical enquiry abilities are durably compressed and 
conformity increased.  
 
6.1 Policy action and conformity with inclusive social preferences 
To illustrate some of our points, consider policy incentives towards alternative governance 
forms. These are provided through legal frameworks, local development policies, and more 
generally by means of deliberative skills through education and training (which, especially in 
business education, is also subject to the strategic choices of higher education organisations 
(Sugden, 2013)).viii  
Awareness of alternatives and critical mass, markedly in the presence of habits of thought and 
organisational inertia, can be fostered by policies that channel the commitment of production 
organisations towards particular sets of strategies. Here commitment entails the possibility of 
stringent adherence to collectively defined rules, which may require contractual solutions or 
radical governance changes (Sacconi, 2011).ix  This approach to the emergence of preferences 
for particular choices is supported by Grimalda and Sacconi’s theory of preference formation 
for which preferences result from the joint consideration of different descriptions of states of 
affair (Grimalda and Sacconi, 2005). If the description regards culminating consequences, 
preferences that are inclusive or exclusive of the interests of others are relevant. Differently, 
when descriptions are presented in deontological terms, as situations where preferences show 
whether the agent is capable of choices that are consistent with particular shared principles, 




then psychological preferences for conformity are relevant (Grimalda and Sacconi, 2005; 
Sacconi and Faillo, 2010). The way reality is described or presented (e.g. through policy, or 
through a “social contract”) does matter in triggering preferences, and in particular in 
prompting reciprocity in complying with principles, forming, through social interaction, 
beliefs resulting in degrees of mutually expected conformance. 
As an exemplification of gradual movements from cell four towards cell three by means of 
pre-commitment to a set of principles, consider the recent introduction, in the UK, of the 
community benefit clause in public procurement (CBC). CBCs essentially require contractors 
to deliver social value added to communities. These clauses are generally meant to maximise 
local social welfare generated by public demand, for example for infrastructures or specific 
services (such as employability services). Specifically, policies at local and regional level in 
the UK have identified the production of value added with respect to employment, training 
and urban regeneration. The criteria set by public administrations aim at delivering wider 
social benefits than those associated exclusively with the provision of a particular good or 
service. For example, CBCs may require, directly or indirectly, contracting out activities to 
social enterprises. In this way, the conventional business firm commits (at least within the 
remit of the procurement contract) to the implementation of some inclusive social strategies, 
clearly encouraged by the institutional framework defined by CBCs. Moreover, when a 
conventional for-profit company commits to the production of community benefits, 
stakeholders’ expectations towards the inclusion of wider public interests may change beyond 
the remit of the initial commitment contract and become a permanent feature of the aims and 
processes of organisations (Sacconi et al. 2011). Following renewed stakeholder expectations 
and learning generated through engagement with social enterprises, organisations may further 
adjust their governance and/or strategies, conforming to shared expectations (Grimalda and 
Sacconi, 2005).  Specifically the evolution of social preferences towards inclusion would 
occur when conventional businesses and social enterprises enter a reciprocal learning process 
which may prompt a change of strategic aims and related processes beyond and consistently 
with the remit of CBCs. 
  
6.2 Institutions matter: historical circumstances and prevailing values  
Historical trajectories stemming from past choices have been argued to influence the 
evolution of institutions and socio-economic organisations and explain institutional variety 
across regions and countries (North, 1990; Salamon and Anheier, 1998). To illustrate, 
consider that albeit representing in general the expression of a niche business culture, since 
the end of WWIIx, in the southern part of Europe cooperation has considerably grown, whilst 
in England their presence remained weak. Countries like Spain and Italy, for example, have 
had a long-standing and stable tradition in self-management.xi In Italy, as Zamagni (2006) 
observes, ideas of human dignity, fairness and solidarity across a variety of political 
orientations (liberal, socialist and catholic) ensured support across local administrations and 
contributed (together with other elements, such as the solidarity and ties amongst 




cooperatives formally coordinated through federations and consortia) to the continuity over 
time of the cooperative business form. This process was supported by the recognition in the 
1948 Italian Constitution of the role of cooperativesxii, and in the implementation of this 
principle through consistent legislation and fiscal incentives (Zamagni 2006).  
Traditionally operating in agriculture and credit, cooperatives extended also to the provision 
of social services, finding a suitable terrain in those Southern European Countries that where 
lacking sufficient provision (Borzaga, 2004; Borzaga et al. 2011; Defourny and Nyssens, 
2010). The establishment of social cooperative enterprises is an interesting case, since it 
builds on previous critical mass of cooperative values embedded in the existing framework 
that defined cooperative firms and on other complementary institutional arrangements, 
including the existence of a cooperative credit sector. Still, this organisational typology 
required some degree of institutional innovation. The first specific law on social enterprises 
appeared in Italy in 1991,xiii together with a supporting regional and national system 
composed of intermediate associations, academic research and education, professional 
training, and data collection on social cooperative enterprises.xiv The emergence of a network 
of supporting institutions and initiatives suggest, therefore, that the development and 
diffusion of the values of social enterprises, their aims and form of governance, coexisting 
with traditional ones, have been a viable but demanding challenge, which required individual 
initiative together with a co-evolution of habits, legal framework, production structure, and 
supportive complementary institutions (Nelson, 1994; Amable, 2000; Boyer, 2005).  
The family nature of local capitalism and the prevalence of small and medium enterprises 
have also been argued to have left more space for the development of alternative business 
forms if compared to systems dominated by large equity-based corporations, such as the UK 
(Zamagni, 2006; Everett and Minkler, 1993). Here, in the late 1970s, a neo-liberal approach 
to policy and economic choices, paired by the economic weaknesses, strategic mistakes, and 
member opportunism in collectively-managed organisations brought to the privatisations and 
demutualisation of most of the existing building societies as well as of other mutuals 
(Birchall, 2001).xv Mismanagement at firm level and demutualisation policy clearly illustrate 
movements from the expression, at least in principle, of inclusive social preferences towards 
the membership (as in cells 1 and 2), to conventional business forms (as in cells 3 and 4). 
More generally, mismanagement signals a weakening of inclusive social preferences in 
managers (assuming that such preferences existed) and their displacement by exclusive 
preferences, alongside the effects on members’ motivation and preferences, as suggested by 
Ben-Ner and Ellman (2012).  
 
7. Conclusions and implications 
The persistence of strategic failure, i.e. the misalignment between preferences reflecting the 
private interests of restricted groups and those of publics and society at large, has provided 
socio-economic relevance to our study. We have argued that a reduction of strategic failure 
can occur by reinstating enquiry and inclusion in choices about production governance and 
processes. This would require cooperation rather than mere coordination, as in terms of 




shared access to decision-making and use of deliberation. These dispositions, at least in 
principle, are likely to be present in the governance settings of self-managed organisations 
(but also, to a more limited extent, in conventional firms, albeit confined to specific 
responsible practices). More generally the rules that define governance and strategic decision-
making processes express the decision-makers’ pre-commitment towards enquiry. Some 
arrangements will acknowledge a variety of interests and perspectives into the initial 
constitutional process, such as organisations with multi-stakeholder governance; others will 
focus on some interests in particular. Our taxonomy identifies and classifies production 
organisations with respect to their potential to generate strategic failure or, in other words, by 
the degree of exclusion of publics and social good from comprehensive outcomes.  
The role of policy and regulation, therefore, is not understood as constraining, but in fact as 
enabling particular types of behaviours and impacts which would otherwise be marginalised 
because of prevailing interests. Policy may not and probably should not, try to change habits 
directly. Rather it may change them indirectly “by modifying conditions, by an intelligent 
selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the 
fulfilment of desires” (Dewey, 1922, p. 26). In these respects, the challenge for the decision-
makers at firm and policy level appears to be one of endowing individuals and their 
organisations with a variety of tools, including those that promote engagement in deliberative 
cooperative processes. Through deliberation, the knowledge of contexts, courses of action, 
and their effects is improved and used to critically assess production aims and means. In line 
with Offe (2011), Sacconi (2011), Cowling and Sugden (1998b) and Sacchetti and Sugden 
(2011) this requires that decision-making power is shared across social actors, deliberately 
acting to give voice to multiple publics and reduce strategic failure.  
As part of its potential, the social preferences framework can be used to assess the degree of 
inclusion of publics and wider social values into economic decisions. It may represent also a 
viable explanatory model to assess the consequences of policy action, in terms of its potential 
in generating movement and variations across strategic choice categories. Moreover, the 
inclusive/exclusive nature of preferences reflected in production systems can be related to 
other socio-economic development measures to test which production systems are associated 
with higher levels of individual wellbeing (Erdal, 2011; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). 
Beyond private firms, the framework could be also applied to governmental organisations. 
Decision-makers in the public government arena develop different views of the world and 
adopt, not less than others, diverse behaviours with respect to the inclusion of publics and 
social interests. For example, the framework can help clarify aspects of social preferences as 
reflected in the analysis of the aims and outcomes of industrial policy (Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2011; Chang, 1997), social policy, in the processes characterising regulatory 
arenas (Hatcher and Moran, 1989), and more generally in practices of problem solving in 
public policy dilemmas (Avio, 2002).  
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i The idea of externalities has been widely acknowledge in economics. As we explain later in 
the paper, however, our approach differ from market failure, supporting the necessity of 
developing complex coordination mechanisms aimed at discovering complex connections 
through enquiry and deliberation, beyond the price mechanism. This can be justified because 
external effects may need to be discovered but also, and more crucially, because it is from the 
choice of processes and praxis that wider social consequences derive. Moreover, deliberative 
processes originate social outcomes that are at least partially intended and governed, whilst 
the price mechanism generates externalities, which are not part of the objective function of 
the decision-maker (at last formally). 
ii
 According to standard views in economics, the State is viewed as acting for the public 
interests against market failures or, as the Chicago school suggests, as the maker of 
regulatory policies which are nonetheless captured by specific industries for their own private 
interest. These perspectives and debate are reviewed by Chang (1997).  
iii
 In Sandel’s view, the temptation to decontextualize choice from its context has seduced 
Rawls (1971) who, whilst seeking a construct for achieving just choices, had to cut bridges 
with individual identity and experience (Sandel, 1982; Quinn et al. 1997). This is however a 
problematic argument that would deserve a wider debate. In Rawl’s defence, the pre-
commitment to the creation of an unbiased normative framework can be considered as a 
necessary condition for the development of the type of democratic interaction envisaged for 
example in the pragmatist approach.  
iv Market failure theory has emphasised that in most circumstances individual preferences 
have external (positive or negative) implications, although these are considered mainly as 
indirect effects of private action, which can be explained by the perfectibility of market 
institutions, as for externalities and market power. See also endnote 1. 
v
 Building on the limitations of inductive reasoning, Taleb (2007) has recently attributed to 
rare improbable events, which are not knowledgeable through empiricism, the main reason of 
contextual uncertainty.   
vi
 Typically marking internal practices about decisions on incentives, investments, inter-firm 
coordination , industrial relations, community involvement, environmental and consumer 
policy.   
vii
 Autonomous motivation that stems from extrinsic but internalized values and rules, in this sense, is similar to 
the autonomy of intrinsic motivation, which is typically defined in terms of the person being interested in the 
activity for its own sake (Gagné and Deci,2005; Deci and Ryan, 1990). 




                                                                                                                                                        
viii
 Academia has also been argued to have a specific policy role in selecting and weighting 
beliefs. Within economics and business, in particular, the discipline has historically exerted 
strong influence on economic policies as well as in shaping the nature of businesses and their 
strategies (Currie et al., 2010; Fleckenstein, 1997).   
ix
 The perspective is different from stakeholder theory, where the inclusion of stakeholder 
interests is typically presented in the context of win-win situations that emerge spontaneously 
and despite a conventional governance structure. 
x
 In Italy, after 1924, during fascism, and until the end of the war, all civic and economic 
associations had been forbidden by law, thus putting a halt to the diffusion of cooperatives.  
xi
 Over the last thirty years, in Italy cooperation entered a clear growing pattern. In 2001 
cooperative firms represented 1.2 % of firms counting for about 6 % of the total employment 
(ISTAT, 2008). Using national census data Zamagni (2006) observes that during 1990-2000 
the overall occupation grew by 60.1 % within cooperatives, contributing to one fourth of the 
overall occupational growth for the decade. 
xii
 Article 45 states: “The Republic recognises the social function of co-operation of a 
mutualistic, non-speculative nature. The law promotes and encourages co-operation through 
appropriate means and ensures its character and purposes through adequate controls…” 
xiii
 In the Trentino region, where cooperation has a longstanding tradition, national legislation 
was anticipated by a regional law in 1989. 
xiv
 In 1994, Issan, an international research and policy network on cooperative and social 
enterprises later named Euricse, was created in collaboration with the cooperatives 
federation, the representative association for commerce and tourism and the Faculty of 
Economics at the University of Trento, in the Trentino Region. Membership was later 
extended to ensure the development of the initiative and gain international visibility.  The 
institutional recognition of cooperative models was strengthened further in 1997 when the 
Third Sector National Forum was officially instituted at the national level and recognized by 
the government as representative of the sector’s interests, and in 1999 when sectorial data 
started to be collected in periodic census by the national statistical institute, ISTAT. 
xv
 Differently from the UK, in some countries demutualisation is not an option. If it were, as 
the UK case shows, opportunistic behaviours of members or managers would be incentivised. 
In fact, because cooperatives accumulate indivisible reserves over time, selling an established 
cooperative permits members to appropriate all the value accumulated by previous members, 
placing the continuity of cooperative firms in jeopardy (Tortia, 2007). 
